Oil & Gas LibraryOILGASLIBRARY.COM Subscribe
Home / Sectors / HSE / Real Incidents & Lessons Learned / BP Texas City Refinery Explosion
BP Texas City refinery explosion

BP Texas City refinery explosion

March 23, 2005 · Texas City Refinery, Texas, United States

Video coming soonThe case study video will appear here as soon as it is published on the channel.
  • 15fatalities
  • 180injured
  • 43,000people ordered to shelter in place
  • Over $1.5 billionin financial losses

What Happened?

  • On March 23, 2005, at 1:20 PM, one of the worst industrial disasters in modern U.S. history occurred at the BP Texas City refinery: explosions and fires killed 15 people, injured 180 others, and caused financial losses exceeding $1.5 billion.
  • The accident occurred during startup of the isomerization (ISOM) unit, when the raffinate splitter tower was overfilled. Pressure relief devices opened, discharging a geyser of flammable liquid from the atmospheric blowdown stack, which was not connected to a flare. The release of flammable hydrocarbons led to an explosion and fire.
  • All fatalities occurred inside or near temporary office trailers positioned close to the blowdown drum. A shelter-in-place order was issued for 43,000 residents, and homes were damaged up to three-quarters of a mile away from the refinery.

Root Causes Identified by the CSB Report

  • Personal safety was what was measured and rewarded, while process safety performance improvement did not receive equivalent focus.
  • Budget cuts impaired process safety performance at the refinery.
  • An effective reporting and learning culture had not been established: reporting bad news was discouraged, and incidents were often investigated ineffectively.
  • Design deficiencies: no flare to combust effluent entering the blowdown system, no automated high-level shutoff on the tower, and insufficient instrumentation to warn of overfilling.
  • Supervision and support by experienced, technically trained personnel were not ensured during unit startup—a particularly hazardous phase.

Lessons Learned

  • Low personal injury rates do not mean the risk of major process accidents is low.
  • Startup and shutdown phases require accurate written operating procedures and experienced supervision.
  • Never locate office trailers and occupied buildings close to hazardous process units.
  • Relief and blowdown systems must discharge to a flare or closed safe disposal system, never directly to the atmosphere.

References

  1. U.S. Chemical Safety Board — BP America (Texas City) Refinery Explosion (investigation page)
  2. CSB — Final Investigation Report, Report No. 2005-04-I-TX (2007)

All facts and figures on this page are sourced from the official reports listed above. This content is educational and does not replace reading the comprehensive original investigation reports.

← All Incidents